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Sense of control refers to one’s feelings to control environmental events through one’s
own action. A prevailing view is that the sense of control is strong (or is not diminished)
when predicted sensory signals, which are generated in motor control mechanisms, are
consistent with afferent sensory signals. Such intact sense of control often leads to the
misjudgment of temporal relation between timings of one’s action and its effect (so-
called, intentional binding). The present study showed that the intentional binding could
be enhanced by the delayed visual feedback of an agent’s action. We asked participants
to press a button to produce a tone as action outcome. In some conditions, they were
given the delayed visual feedback of their button press. Participants judged whether
the onset of the auditory outcome was delayed from the timing of their button press.
Consequently, delay detection thresholds were significantly higher when the feedback
was given 0.2 and 0.4 s delays than when no feedback was displayed to the participants.
The results indicate that action agents misjudge the timing of their action (button press) in
the presence of the delayed visual feedback of their action. Interestingly, delay detection
thresholds were strongly correlated with the subjective magnitude of the sense of control.
Thus, the sense of control is possibly determined by cross-modal processing for action-
related and outcome-related sensory signals.
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INTRODUCTION
For an action agent to perceptually ensure that she/he is interacting with the external world, the
agent’s brain needs to comprehend a relation between our action and its outcome. Monitoring
(and correcting) an action-outcome relation is a critical component to on-line motor control
(Wolpert et al., 1995). The sense of control for external events has been discussed on the basis
of the framework of motor control theory (Haggard and Chambon, 2012). Sense of control
refers to one’s feelings that one’s own action effectively controls one’s environments. Here
we used the term sense of control, instead of sense of agency, to differentiate the feeling of
control for external events from the feeling of control for action. For example, we often feel
that our button press (action) turns off/on of a computer (outcome). On the other hand, we
may not feel such control when the change in the state of the computer is delayed from our
button press. The effect of temporal proximity between the button press and the state change
of the computer on sense of control can be explained in terms of the congruency between
predicted (efferent) and (actual) afferent sensory signals of the outcome (Blakemore et al., 1999).
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When a delay between action and its outcome is small, the
congruency between efferent and afferent sensory signals is
high, and eventually, the sense of control gets high (or is not
diminished). On the contrary, when the delay is large, their
congruency is low, and thus, the sense of control is also low.
Other lines of study have also discussed that not only
motor control mechanism, but also cognitive and/or perceptual
mechanisms determine the sense of control. For example, as
long as prior thought (or expectation) about action control
is congruent with an actual action, the sense of control is
maintained even when a person other than the agent who
executes the prior thought conducts the actual action (Wegner
and Wheatley, 1999; Wegner et al., 2004). That is, a causality
perception among expectation, action, and outcome drives the
sense of control.
One strong measure of sense of control is subjective time
perception between an agent’s action and its effect. It is
now well known that the timing of an agent’s action is
subjectively attracted toward the timing of action outcome,
and vice versa—so-called intentional binding (Haggard et al.,
2002). Intentional binding gets weaker as the temporal proximity
between action and its outcome is larger, and the reduction
of intentional binding possibly occurs correlatively with the
reduction of the sense of control. At first, intentional binding
was discussed in terms of the congruency between predicted
and actual sensory signals (Haggard, 2008). On the other
hand, recent studies have reported that intentional binding
is sensitive to higher-order factors such as the emotional
valence of stimuli (Yoshie and Haggard, 2013), causal belief
of agent (Desantis et al., 2011; Haering and Kiesel, 2012),
and causality perception (Buehner and Humphreys, 2009;
Buehner, 2012), which seemingly are irrelevant to motor
control mechanism itself. Thus, intentional binding as well as
sense of control is not possibly driven by single, exclusive
calculation mechanism. Rather, multiple processing stages in
the brain likely operate in the determination of sense of
agency.
Recently, the role of multimodal sensory processing in the
sense of control has been proposed (Farrer et al., 2013; Kawabe
et al., 2013). Above all, Kawabe et al. (2013) demonstrated that
hindering temporal grouping between action and its outcome
effectively weakened intentional binding as well as sense of
control rating, and indicated that the causality perception on
the basis of perceptual grouping is an important principle in the
computation of the sense of control.
Here, we were interested in how the determination of the
action-related timing could affect the sense of control for external
events. When we press a button to cause an auditory outcome,
we usually press the button while seeing the movement of our
fingers, and finally hear the outcome. Thus, the brain seems
to integrate haptic, visual, and auditory signals into a coherent
representation, ‘‘I pressed a button to cause a tone’’. In this
situation, it is postulated that the brain evaluates a temporal offset
between the auditory outcome and the haptic/visual signals of the
button press, and determine the strength of grouping between
them. A critical question here is how the brain determines the
timing of the button press. In the example above, the brain needs
to crossmodally determine the timing of the button press by
integrating visual and haptic signals.
The present study investigated how the delayed visual
feedback of the button press affected the sense of control for
an auditory outcome of an agent’s button press. Delayed visual
feedback of one’s action can be perceptually integrated with
actual action unless their temporal discrepancy was not so
large (Shimada et al., 2009, 2010; Keetels and Vroomen, 2012).
However, it is still unclear when an action agent feels that
her/his action has been completed under the situation wherein
the delayed visual feedback of the action is given to the agent. If
the timing judgment for actual action is attracted in the direction
of the delayed visual feedback of the action, the temporal distance
between an actual action and an auditory outcome is subjectively
compressed, and eventually the sense of control for auditory
outcome is possibly enhanced. In Experiment 1, we found that
the delayed visual feedback modulated intentional binding. In
Experiment 2, we also observed that delayed visual feedbacks
could modulate subjective rating values for the sense of control.
The modulation of the intentional binding was correlated with
the modulation of the subjective rating task. Based on the results,
we discuss that the brain determines the sense of control on the
basis of the cross-modal processing for temporal relation among
action-related and outcome-related sensory signals.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we examined how the delayed visual feedback
of an agent’s button press could affect the intentional binding. As
in the previous literature (Farrer et al., 2013; Kawabe et al., 2013),
we asked participants to report whether the onset of an auditory
outcome was delayed from their button press. We predicted
that the delay detection thresholds would increase if the action-
execution timing was attracted in the direction of the delayed
visual feedback of the action.
Method
Participants
Eight right-handed healthy observers (five females and three
males), who had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity
and normal hearing ability, participated in this experiment. Their
mean (and SD) age was 35 (1.1) years. They were naive as to
the purpose of this study, and paid for their participation. They
reported they had no history of major medical or neurological
illness. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from
the ethical committee of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation (NTT Communication Science Laboratories Ethical
Committee). The experiments in this study were conducted
according to the principles in the Helsinki Declaration. Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants in this
study.
Apparatus
Visual stimuli were presented on a 21-inch LCDmonitor (Iiyama
G2773HS) with a resolution of 1920 × 1080 pixels and the
refresh rate of 60 Hz. To present auditory stimuli, we used
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headphones (HDA 200, Sennheiser). A computer (Mac mini,
Apple) controlled stimulus presentation and data collection
with MATLAB and Psychophysics toolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997;
Pelli, 1997). We confirmed the physical onset timing among
visual and auditory stimuli by using an oscilloscope connected
to a phototransistor and a microphone. To capture scenes of
the button press, we used a USB camera (ELECOM UCAM-
DKL130TRD). We measured the time taken to conduct video
processing (including the transmission of video signals from the
camera, and the presentation of the signals on the LCD display)
by using a LED, a phototransistor, and oscilloscope, and found
that it took 100 ms for the video processing to be completed.
Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of the delayed visual feedback of the button
press, and auditory outcome (Figure 1A). The delayed visual
feedback was on-line video images that were refreshed with
the frame rate of 30 Hz. The spatial size of the feedback was
640 × 480 pixels (8 × 6 deg). The feedback was presented at the
center of the display against a neutral gray background. On each
block of trials, the fixed amount of delay was inserted between
actual hand movements and visual feedback. The amount of
delay (feedback delay) was chosen from 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.8 s. In
these conditions, the actual hand movements of the participants
were hidden by an occluder. We also conducted 0 ms delay
block in which participants conducted tasks by directly seeing
their hand movement to press a key. In no feedback condition,
the participants saw neither the delayed visual feedback on
the display nor their actual hand movements. The auditory
outcome was a 1kHz tone whose duration was 16 ms with
2 ms rising/falling amplitude periods. The onset of the auditory
outcome was delayed from the timing of actual button press.
The amount of the outcome delay was randomly chosen from
0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6 s within a block. That is,
the delay of the delayed visual feedback was a between-block
factor, and the delay of the auditory outcome was a within-block
factor.
Procedure
They sat at the 70 cm distance from themonitor. In all conditions
except 0 ms delay condition, the participants were asked to press
an assigned key (an uparrow key on the keyboard) while looking
at the monitor (Figure 1B). In the 0 ms delay condition, they
pressed the key while looking at their key press. With the delay
(outcome delay), a tone was emitted from the headphone as
an action outcome. Participants were asked to report whether
the onset of the auditory outcome was delayed from the button
press. They reported their judgment by pressing assigned keys
by fingers of the left hand. Each outcome delay condition was
repeated 20 times. Thus, each block consisted of 140 trials. The
order of the trials was randomized. The order among the six
blocks of feedback conditions was randomized. A participant
received 840 trials. It took 3 h (including breaks) to complete all
experimental blocks.
FIGURE 1 | (A) Illustration of the situation wherein delayed visual feedback of the button press is given in between the timing of the button press and the timing of
the auditory outcome onset. Here, visual feedback is an on-online streaming video with some delays. (B) A photograph of a scene in which a person is pressing the
button to cause a tone while looking at the monitor.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Proportions of trials in which the participants reported the onset delay of the auditory outcome from the button press for each feedback conditions.
NVF represents no visual feedback condition. (B) Delay detection thresholds for each feedback condition.
Results and Discussion
We calculated the proportion of trials in which the participants
felt the delay of auditory outcome onsets, and plotted them in
Figure 2A. In each feedback condition, we individually estimated
the outcome delay that caused 50% proportions of the onset
delay reports, and defined it as a delay detection threshold.
The delay detection thresholds across conditions are plotted in
Figure 2B. The delay detection thresholds were analyzed with a
one-way repeated measures analysis of variance with feedback
delay as a within-subject factor. The main effect was significant
[F(5,35) = 4.256, p < 0.005]. Multiple comparison tests (Ryan’s
method) showed that the detection thresholds in 200 ms and 400
ms feedback delay conditions were significantly higher than those
in no feedback condition (p < 0.05). The detection threshold in
200 ms feedback delay condition was significantly higher than
that in 0 ms feedback delay condition (p< 0.05).
The results indicate that the delayed visual feedback of one’s
action can modulate the intentional binding. It is known that
the sense of agency for the delayed feedback of ones’s action
is retained unless the delay exceeds 300–400 ms (Shimada
et al., 2009, 2010). Consistent with the previous data, in the
present study, the delayed visual feedback affected the delay
detection threshold when the feedback delay was less than
400 ms. We suggest that the visual and haptic (or motor)
action-related signals were integrated as long as the sense of
agency for delayed feedback of the action is retained, and this
caused the misjudgment of the action timing in the direction
of the delayed visual feedback. The effect of delayed visual
feedback of the action disappeared in the 800 ms feedback
delay condition. This is possibly because the participants no
longer felt the sense of control for the button press in the
visual feedback with the large delay. On the other hand, the
effect of delayed visual feedback was not observed in 100
ms feedback condition even when the delay of the visual
feedback was relatively small. In this condition, however,
the delay detection thresholds might not be affected by the
delayed visual feedback because the misjudgment itself was small
and thus played a minor role in modulating delay detection
thresholds.
EXPERIMENT 2
We examined how the delayed visual feedback modulated the
sense of control. Instead of asking about the outcome delay,
we asked the observer to rate the sense of control for the
auditory outcome. We predicted that the sense of control
would be enhanced in the feedback delay conditions wherein
the delayed visual feedback significantly increased the delay
detection thresholds in Experiment 1.
Method
Participants
Ten right-handed healthy observers (six females and four males),
who had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and
normal hearing ability, participated in this experiment. Their
mean (and SD) age was 33 (0.8) years. They were naïve to the
purpose of the study, had not participated in Experiment, and
paid for their participation. They reported they had no history of
major medical or neurological illness.
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Apparatus and Stimuli
Identical to those used in Experiment 1 except that the amount
of the outcome delay was randomly chosen from 0.1, 0.2, 0.4,
0.6, and 0.8 s within a block. We expanded the temporal range
of the outcome delay because in the preliminary observation,
some observers reported the mild sense of control even in the
0.6 s outcome delay condition, which was the largest delay in
Experiment 1.
Procedure
Identical to that used in Experiment 1 except for the following. In
this experiment, the participants were asked to rate the subjective
strength of the sense of control for the auditory tone coming
after their button press. They used ‘‘1’’ for no control and ‘‘5’’
for full control, and intermediate values for intermediate levels
of control. Each outcome delay condition was repeated 20 times.
Thus, each block consisted of 100 trials. The order of the trials
was randomized. The order among the six blocks of feedback
conditions was randomized. A participant received 600 trials. It
took 3 h (including breaks) to complete all experimental blocks.
Results and Discussion
For each of feedback and outcome delay conditions, we
calculatedmean rating values for the sense of control, and plotted
them in Figure 3A. We analyzed the rating data by the two-
way repeated measures analysis of variance with the feedback
and outcome delays as within-subject factors. The main effect of
outcome delay was significant [F(4,36) = 131.210, p< 0.0001]. The
main effect of feedback delay was also significant [F(5,45) = 6.130,
p < 0.0003]. Multiple comparison tests for the main effect of
feedback delay showed that the rating values in 0.2 and 0.4 s
feedback delay conditions were significantly higher than those in
no visual feedback condition, and 0 s feedback delay conditions.
Moreover, the rating values in 0.4 s feedback delay condition
were significantly higher than those in 0.8 s condition (p< 0.05).
Importantly, the interaction between two factors was significant
[F(20,180) = 2.769, p< 0.0003]. Simplemain effects of the feedback
delay were significant when the outcome delay was 0.4 s (p <
0.0001), 0.6 s (p < 0.0001), and 0.8 s (p < 0.0003). Multiple
comparison tests of the simple main effect for the 0.4 s outcome
delay condition showed that the rating values in 0.2 and 0.4 s
outcome delay conditions were significantly higher than those
in no visual feedback and 0 s outcome delay conditions (p <
0.05). Multiple comparison tests of the simple main effect for
the 0.6 s outcome delay condition showed that the rating values
in 0.4 s outcome delay conditions were significantly higher than
those in no visual feedback condition, and 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, and
0.8 s outcome delay conditions (p < 0.05). Multiple comparison
tests of the simple main effect for the 0.8 s outcome delay
condition showed that the rating values in 0.4 s outcome delay
conditions were significantly higher than those in no visual
feedback condition, and 0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.8 s outcome delay
conditions (p< 0.05).
Moreover, we calculated correlation coefficients between the
delay detection thresholds in Experiment 1 and the rating values
in this experiment, which were obtained under the identical
feedback delays. We plotted those values for each of feedback
delay conditions in Figure 3B, wherein we collapsed the data
across outcome delay conditions. The reason why we collapsed
data is because we wanted to directly analyze how the delay
detection thresholds which were modulated by feedback delays
in Experiment 1 affected the rating values which were modulated
by the identical feedback delays in Experiment 2. As a result, the
two values were linearly correlated (r2 = 0.76).
The delayed visual feedback stronglymodulated the subjective
sense of control. The sense of agency rating increased when the
feedback delay was 0.2 and 0.4 s, consistent with the Experiment
1’s results showing that delay detection thresholds increased
when the feedback delay was 0.2 and 0.4 s. Importantly, the rating
values for sense of control were strongly correlated with delay
detection thresholds. Taken together, the results indicate that the
delayed visual feedback of the action can strengthen the temporal
grouping between an actual action and its effect, and this causes
the enhanced sense of control.
FIGURE 3 | (A) Rating values for the sense of control in Experiment 2. The leftmost data points and dashed lines represent the results of no visual feedback
condition for each of outcome delay conditions. (B) Correlational plots between delay detection threshold in Experiment 1 and sense of control rating in Experiment
2. Each datum dot represents each of feedback delay conditions.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
We phenomenologically observed that the delayed visual
feedback of the button press caused the misjudgment of a
temporal relation between the actual button press and its
auditory outcome, and enhanced the sense of control for the
auditory outcome. The results are consistent with the previous
suggestion that multimodal sensory processing can underlie the
determination of the sense of control (Farrer et al., 2013; Kawabe
et al., 2013). The delayed visual feedback of the button press
caused the misjudgment of timing between action-related visual
and tactile signals, and eventually this caused the misjudgment
of the temporal distance between the actual button press and its
auditory outcome.
It is still unclear why such misjudgment was caused by the
delayed visual feedback. One possibility is that the participants
had a biased judgment of the button press timing toward
the delayed visual feedback. That is, the participants might
postdictively misinterpret a temporal position of the button
press in the presence of the delayed visual feedback, and this
eventually caused the misinterpretation of a temporal distance
between action-related and outcome-related signals. It is well
known that such postdictive misjudgment occurs in various
types of perceptual events (Kawabe, 2012; Shimojo, 2014). The
other possibility is that perceptual timing of actual button press
was pulled in the direction of delayed visual feedback, and
perceived temporal distance between the button press and its
auditory outcome was compressed. Heron et al. (2009) showed
that humans could adapt to the temporal discrepancy between
the button press and its oucome (flash), and exhibited temporal
recalibration between them even when the temporal discrepancy
was 0.4 s but not when 0.8 s (though the critical temporal
discrepancy for temporal recalibrations varies across the previous
studies; see also Sugano et al., 2010 and Toida et al., 2014). In
this line, the observer in our experiment might adapt to the
temporal discrepancy between the actual button press and its
delayed feedback, and this might also compress the subjective
temporal distance between the button press and the outcome.
The two possibilities cannot be disentangled by the present data,
and are left for future studies.
In either case, the phenomenon reported by the present
study is possibly related to cross-modal temporal processing.
Conventionally, the perception of sensorimotor temporal lags
and the adaptation to the temporal lags have been discussed
in terms of motor processing mechanism and its variants
(Blakemore et al., 1999; Cunningham et al., 2001; Synofzik
et al., 2008). A previous study (Shimada et al., 2014) also
reported that the decrease of sense of body-ownership could
affect the delay detection rates for visuotactile asynchronous
stimulation. This line of previous studies have used two
sequential sensory stimuli, and asked how the temporal relation
between the stimuli was perceived. On the other hand, the
present study treats the case with the three sequential sensory
stimuli, where the first two are related to the action-related
signals and the third one is related to the effect-related
signals. The observers needed to assess the temporal relation
between the action-related and outcome-related signals. It is
plausible to assume that the processing underlying the present
phenomenon is likely hierarchical. The sensorimotor system first
resolves the temporal aspect of action-related signals, and second
higher-order comparators assess the temporal timing between
action-related and outcome-related signals. Such assessments
of temporal timing between sensory signals are mediated by
cross-modal mechanism (Roseboom et al., 2013a,b). Thus, it
is possible that perceptual processing other than motor-related
processing underlies the phenomenon reported by the present
study.
The hierarchical processing for action-related and outcome-
related signals is perhaps related to the already-reported
interaction between the sense of control for action and the
sense of control for external events. Chambon and Haggard
(2012) reported that the fluency for action selection was a
strong determinant for the sense of control for external events,
indicating that implicit action-related processing may affect the
strength of the sense of control. Taken our results together
with the results of Chambon and Haggard, the mechanism
for determining the sense of control is possibly dependent on
hierarchical processing on action itself, outcome itself, and their
relations.
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